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SOCIAL ENGINEERING AND CRIME PREVENTION IN CYBERSPACE  




This chapter highlights methods of syntactic and semantic social engineering attacks (human-
based and computer-based) that are currently prevalent in the cyber community. It will also 
present the emerging trends in high-tech crime; and, the likely future direction cyber-crime 
will take with respect to social engineering.  
 
What is Social Engineering? 
In this context ‘social engineering’ is the term used to describe the use of psychological tricks, 
the manipulation of behaviour often through deception, by cyber-criminals on unsuspecting 
users to gain ‘access information’. Cyber-criminals can be those people that we already 
‘label’ as hackers and conmen who use social engineering in their avoidance of complex 
technical means to access computers in order to commit crime. 
 
The users become the primary target associated with the cyber-criminals’ secondary target, 
such as the organisation’s computer system; which in turn may lead to a tertiary or main 
target such as a system control program, database, financial or telecommunication system. 
Cyber-criminals will try to gain this ‘access information’ enabling them to bypass security. 
This can include usernames and passwords, PIN’s (personal identification numbers), tokens 
and credit card information (Federal Communications Commission 2002). Once they have 
gained access to the system they are then able to erase, modify or copy the information to suit 
the needs of their attack (Guenther 2001). 
 
Social engineering manipulates any individual’s innate desires (e.g. friendship, romance, 
greed) by building a trust relationship with the target; and, then exploiting that relationship to 
obtain the information required. 
 
Part of the process involved in social engineering includes ID theft. In the past, this provided 
a means for a hacker to reach their final goal in accessing a network or system; today, ID theft 




As ICT (information communications technologies) continue to evolve, we see an increasing 
use of the internet for the conduct and development of e-commerce, particularly for secure 
financial transactions. Tied to this development, we also see a parallel with an increase in the 
sophistication of ICT security utilising encryption, specialist hardware, improved application 
software, tokens, firewalls and other such. The problem is that whilst computer users are 
becoming more technically competent and computer-security literate, there has not been a 
comparable ‘learning’ or development of ‘awareness’ in the security aspects associated with 
social engineering. This applies to both within the corporate and home environments.  
 
Corporate identity fraud (Fite 2006); the theft of an individual’s identity; and, Online Auction 
Crime (forthcoming publication of the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) 2007) can 
all be capitalised upon using social engineering.  
 
This aspect may become an even greater issue for ICT security in the future, as the attributes 
of successive generations of the population are seen to hold different values. For example, the 
‘baby-boomers’ are now heading towards retirement age and are quite different in attributes 
when compared  with the current ‘x’ and ‘y’ generations of today.  
 
‘Baby-boomers’ attributes are perceived as having a ‘belief in the government’; ‘not being 
very computer literate’; are ‘loyal and conservative’; ‘reliable’ and, for the most part are 
‘intuitive about the consequences of their actions’. The ‘x’ generation are seen as being 
‘technically competent’; ‘somewhat lacking in intuitive ability’; discontent; and ‘they blame 
the previous generation for their current situation’. The ‘y’ generation are considered ‘highly 
technically competent’; ‘lacking good role-models’; are ‘self-centred’; ‘lack consideration for 
others’; and, ‘are only concerned with the present’.  This perceptive erosion of values, based 
on these social attributes, may impact on security in the future through an evolution of 




Motivation for Hackers 
There are a variety of motivations that exist in human behaviour for the deceptions involved 
social engineering: 
 
• Technical Avoidance. Social engineering is perceived as a much easier path to 
financial gain rather than become involved in trying to breach a complex and 
cumbersome technical pathway. 
 
• Self-Education.  Whilst it seems to be much more infrequent, there are still those 
hackers who are motivated simply by the thrill of ‘gaining knowledge’; and 
‘beating the system’. 
 
• Financial Gain.  Motivation for financial gain information gathering can be 
triggered by many reasons: feeding a habit (an addiction); seen as an easy way to 
get money; organised crime; blackmail; etc. 
 
• Revenge. Disgruntled employees use weaknesses within the ICT frameworks to 
‘get back’ at the corporate entity; or, they may even target an individual within the 
organisation. 
 
• External Pressure.  Blackmail, ransom, family pressure, organized crime, moral 
dilemmas and extremist beliefs (orders) can be used to apply pressure to an 
individual to commit a cybercrime. From a psychological aspect, the social 
engineer will manipulate the target person’s values so that they are led to believe 
that they are not hurting anyone, ‘after all you are only dealing with zeroes and 
ones’.  
 
• Terrorist, Political and Issue Motivated Groups. These groups can be fanatical 
about their cause and will try and capitalise on weaknesses inherent in the 






• The Wannabe (‘Walter Mitty’). Often people who have psychological issues in 
believing that they are someone who they are not; people who want to be a ‘James 
Bond’ are only motivated to commit a criminal act, to do ‘something daring’, to 
become ‘a spy’ thereby satisfying their own distorted psychological needs. 
 
The Stages in a Social Engineering Attack 
There is a common pattern associated with a social engineering attack (Allan, Noakes-Fry and 
Mogull, 2005). Allen (2006, 5) states that ‘any criminal act has a common pattern. Such a 
pattern is evident with social engineering, and it is both recognizable and preventable.’ Allen 
(2005, 5) suggests that this pattern can be considered as a Cycle consisting of four stages, 
similar to the steps proposed by Cateledge (2005). 
 
There are generally four steps in a social engineering attack (Cateledge 2005, 8-9): 
 
1. Information Gathering – this involves gathering information about the person that 
the social engineer is targeting, or other information about the organisation or 
personnel that will convince the target individual to divulge the required information. 
A variety of techniques can be used to gather information about the targets; this 
information can then be used to build a relationship with either the target or someone 
of influence or important to the success of the attack. Typical information that may be 
gathered could be an internal phone directory; birth dates; organisational charts; 
personnel records, social activities, relationships etc. 
 
2. Development of Relationship – developing a rapport with the target makes it easier 
to obtain the information in the next step. The social engineer will capitalise on the 
psychological aspect of trust. They may feely exploit the willingness of a target in 
order to develop an element of trust from them; often by presenting themselves as a 
more senior member of the organisation who will share a confidence with the target to 
further strengthen the element of trust. 
 
3. Exploitation of Relationship – this refers to the manipulation of the target resulting 
in the social engineer obtaining the information e.g. username and password; or, 




4. Execution to Achieve the Objective – having obtained the required information, the 
social engineer is able to use this to access the system; and the steps or stages are 
complete. 
 
Whilst this example is a simplistic presentation of the stages, it must be remembered that each 
social engineering attack is unique; and, that it is highly likely that many phases or cycles may 
be involved that also incorporate traditional attack methods e.g. hacking, password cracking 
etc. 
 
Psychological Triggers Behind Social Engineering 
Gragg (2002) suggests that since social engineering is a social and psychological activity, it is 
reasonable to try and comprehend the psychology behind social engineering before 
considering the development of a defence system against it. 
 
To be able to do this, it is necessary to recognise the psychological ‘triggers’ that are invoked 
during a social engineering attack. These ‘triggers’ are psychological principles that 
demonstrate a kind of power to influence, persuade or distract people in to behaving 
differently. Understanding these psychological triggers behind social engineering also helps to 
appreciate different aspects that may be used to combat the threat and enhance security. Gragg 
(2002, 6-9) makes particular mention of the following triggers. 
 
Strong Affect - is a trigger that uses a heightened emotional state to enable a hacker to get 
away with more than what would be reasonable. If the victim is feeling a strong sense of 
surprise, anticipation or anger, then the victim will be less likely to think through the 
arguments that are being presented. Strong affect is introduced when the social engineer 
makes some statement at the outset of the interaction that triggers strong emotions. The strong 
affect includes, but is not limited to fear, excitement or panic. This could be the promise of a 
substantial prize worth hundreds or thousands of dollars, or the panic of having an employee’s 
job dependent on one decision. This surge of strong emotions works as a powerful distraction 
and interferes with the victim’s ability to evaluate, think logically or develop a counter-factual 
argument based on tangible facts (Rusch 1999, 4). Counterfactual thinking is a phenomena 
that is related directly to strong affect. Landman (2000, 299) explains how counterfactual 
thinking relies on the possibilities of anticipation and thrill that will short-circuit a person’s 
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reasonable thinking process. A typical example is to have been selected as ‘one of a few to 
win a fabulous prize’. The person ignores the fact that the likelihood of winning is actually 
very remote, but gets distracted by their own thoughts, often leading themselves to risk giving 
away information or access details for the possibility of a prize. It is as if the person is ‘under 
a spell’; or, placed into a different sense of reality which has been brought on by the sudden 
surprise and excitement, with a rush of other emotions. 
 
Overloading - is a condition that is achieved by presenting mistaken premises that are 
unchallenged when they are heard rapidly; this is because they are presented interlaced with 
convincing truisms. This is a psychological trigger of overloading. Having to deal with a lot 
of information quickly affects logical functioning and can produce a ‘sensory overload.’ So 
that with too much information to process, people become ‘mentally passive – they absorb 
information rather than evaluate it’ (Burtner 1991, 2). Arguing from an unexpected 
perspective can also trigger overloading. The target needs time to process the new perspective 
but that time is not available. This leaves the target with too much information and not enough 
time to think it through, reducing the target’s ability to process or scrutinize the argument. 
The target is then more willing to accept arguments that should have been challenged (Petty, 
Fleming, Priester and Feinstein 2001, 2). 
 
Reciprocation - is a psychological trigger that is often used. It is based on the premise that in 
social interactions if someone gives us something or promises us something, we should return 
the favour. This is often the case even when the original gift was not requested or even if what 
is requested in return is far more valuable than what was originally given. This truth is known 
as reciprocation (Rusch 1999, 6). 
 
The hacker, Kevin Mitnick, suggests that “In the corporate environment, people are unlikely 
to evaluate a request thoroughly, so they take a mental shortcut”. The reasoning that follows is 
that if someone calls and is helping with a problem, then that person is ‘one of us’ and is no 
threat (Farber 2002, 1). It is this ‘reverse’ social engineering that makes use of the 
reciprocation trigger. The hacker presents as a helper who is ready, willing and able to fix the 
target’s problems. Even before the problem is resolved, the target feels indebted to the hacker. 




Another way that reciprocation can be used in social engineering is demonstrated by 
behavioural experiments. These experiments show that when two people are in disagreement, 
if one will yield on some point – no matter how small – the other will feel compelled to yield 
as well. For a hacker this is fairly easy. They only need to make more than one request, yield 
in understanding on one, and then the target will feel pressure to yield on the other (Cialdini, 
Green and Rusch 1992, 38). Reciprocation is often seen in the corporate culture. It is an 
unwritten ‘bartering system’ that is considered invaluable if one wants to be successful. One 
employee will help out another with the expectation that, eventually, the favour will be 
returned. 
 
Deceptive Relationships – are built in order to exploit the other person. One way to do this is 
sharing information, a belief, or a perception and discussing it as a common enemy. Mitnick 
(Farber 2002, 1) describes when he was conning an employee who had already become 
suspicious of him in a different context. This time Mitnick was establishing a relationship 
with the employee through email as an alias, by sharing information and technology without 
asking for anything in return. He also helped strengthen the relationship by talking negatively 
about “Kevin Mitnick” whom the employee did not realize was authoring the emails. After 
the relationship was established, Kevin was able to obtain all kinds of information about the 
target’s system. Another way one can build a quick relationship is by appearing to the target 
as if they are very much alike. The idea is for the victim to feel like he and the caller think 
alike, have the same interests or want the same things out of life. Believing that someone has 
characteristics identical or similar to our own provides a strong incentive to deal with that 
person favorably even trusting that person without legitimate motivation (Rusch 1999, 6). 
 
Diffusion of Responsibility - Diffusion of responsibility is when the target is made to feel 
that they will not be held solely responsible for his or her actions. Ironically, this trigger can 
work very well with the use of moral duty as a motivation for the persuasion. Moral duty is 
actioned when the target feels like they are doing something to save a co-worker, to help the 
organisation, or, at least, to avoid feeling guilt (Nelson 2001, 4). The target is made to feel 
that they are making major decisions that will be the major impact between the success and 
failure of the company, or of the “employee” who is calling, implying that the caller may lose 
their job based on their decision. This can often be a very difficult decision for people to make 
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and the target will comply more easily if they believe that they will not be held responsible for 
what happens. 
 
Authority - the majority of people are conditioned to respond to authority. Rusch (1999, 6) 
suggests that people will do a great deal for someone they think is in authority. Consider the 
impact that a bogus director CEO may have on an employee who has not been prepared. This 
trigger is made even more powerful by the reality that it is considered a challenge to even 
verify the legitimacy of the authority. This lack of perspective leaves this trigger wide open 
for exploitation by anyone willing to misrepresent him or herself as an authoritarian figure. 
 
Integrity and Consistency - People tend to follow-through commitments in the workplace, 
even though those commitments may appear to be unsound in the first place. For some it is a 
matter of integrity to “do what you say you are going to do”, even if you are suspicious that 
the request may not have been ‘quite legitimate’. Often this inclination is so strong that staff 
will even carry out their commitments so long as they can justify it to them selves in some 
way so that they believe the requests were made by their fellow employees. Another feature 
of the Integrity and Consistency trigger is that people tend to believe that others express their 
true feelings when they make a statement. Unless there is strong evidence to the opposite, 
people will believe that the person with whom they are talking is telling the truth about what 
they feel or need. The tendency to believe others is based primarily on their own honesty in 
expressing feelings (Rusch 1999, 7). 
 
Common Traits 
Whatever the motivation or technique used, there are certain common traits that usually entice 
the target to comply with the request(s). Allen (2006, 8) suggests that these traits include: 
 
• The movement of responsibility away from the target, so that the target is not considered 
solely responsible for his/her actions. 
 
• The perception by the target that, by conforming with the request, the target will get on the 
‘right side’ of somebody who could award them future benefits, more commonly known as 
‘getting in with the boss’. 
 
• The target's instinct to act morally in helping someone out, thus avoiding the feeling of guilt. 
 
• Communication on a personal level, resulting in the target voluntarily complying with the 




• The target believes he/she is making a reasoned decision in exchange for a small loss of time 
and energy. 
 
The likelihood of the target's compliance is further increased if: 
 
• The aggressor is able to avoid conflict by using a consultative approach rather than an 
aggressive one. 
 
• The aggressor is able to develop and build a relationship through previous dealings. The 
target will probably comply with a large request having previously complied with smaller 
one. 
 
• The aggressor is able to appeal to the target's senses, such as sight and sound. By appealing 
to such senses, the aggressor will be able build a better relationship with the target by 
appearing 'human' rather than just a voice or email message. 
 
• The aggressor has a quick mind and is able to compromise. 
 
 
Methods of Social Engineering 
Social engineering is categorised into two types: Syntactic and Semantic.  
 
SYNTACTIC 
Syntactic social engineering has often been referred to as the ‘second wave’ of network 
attacks. It relates to the network’s operating logic and vulnerabilities such as loop-holes in 
software, denial-of-service and difficulties with cryptographic algorithms (Schneier 2000, 1). 
 
 A syntactic social engineering attack is possible due to intrinsic security failings (Barrett 
1997, 43). Two popular forms of syntactic attacks include the use of malware and smurfing. 
 
Malware – refers to the group of malicious software code which is responsible for the 
distribution of viruses (malicious code that is downloaded onto a computer system through the 
use of attachments or programs, when activated by another user), worms (malicious code that 
once infected on a computer requires no human assistance to replicate and transmit itself to 
other systems) and trojan horses (responsible for creating backdoors in the infected computer 




Smurfing – a Denial of Service attack which uses ‘pings’ to test an internet host’s response. 





Semantic social engineering (or HUMINT, Human Intelligence) is considered to be the third 
and coming-wave of network attacks. It is used to target the security flaws in the people 
operating the computer rather than the machine itself and can be done using human-based or 
computer-based methods (Schneier 2001). As such, semantic social engineering attacks are 
possible due to extrinsic security failures - security measures that have been implemented 
ineffectively (Barrett 1997, 43).  
 
Approaches 
Direct approach.  A targeted individual may be asked to complete the task on behalf of the 
social engineer, such as making a phone call someone inside the organization asking for their 
password and username. 
 
1. Important User by pretending to be a senior manager with an important deadline.  
The social engineer could pressure the help desk operates into disclosing useful information 
such as: telephone numbers to remote access server, type of remote access software that's 
used and how to configure it and what is needed to log in to the server. 
 
2. Helpless User.  Social engineer pretends to be somebody who is helpless, who will 
capitalize on somebody's helpfulness such as secretary that takes pity on them.   
 
3. Technical Support Personnel by pretending to be technical support team member 
social engineer could extract useful information from an unsuspecting user.  Perhaps by 
pretending to be system engineer needing the users password to be able to ‘fix something’. 
 
4. Reverse Social Engineer this technique is when the legitimate user is enticed to ask 




sabotage of the gain access social engineer corrupts the workstation will 
makes it appear that been corrupted.  The use of the system discovers problem tries to 
seek help. 
marketing in order to make sure the user calls the social engineer.  The social 
engineer must advertise, he a can do this by leaving his business cards around target's 
office or by placing his content number on the error message itself. 
 
support finally, social engineer would assist with the problem, making sure 
that the user remains completely unaware and unsuspicious whilst he obtains the 
required information. (Allen 2006) 
 
Methods 
The following is a list of some of the more common methods of human-based and computer 
based semantic social engineering methods: 
 
Phone – a social engineer/hacker calls up the target and presents themselves as a person of 
authority and uses techniques to extract the required information (Granger 2001a) 
 
Eavesdropping – a social engineer may place themselves at a known ‘haunt’ for employees 
of a particular company, to be able to overhear ‘work chat’ over lunch. 
 
Live – individuals gain access to the building of the targeted computer system in order to 
obtain information that may later be used to access the system. Dumpster Diving and 
Shoulder Surfing often form a part of this technique (Guenther 2001). 
 
Dumpster Diving – this refers to individuals sorting through a company’s trash in an attempt 
to retrieve helpful documents i.e. employee records, organisational charts that may assist a 
social engineering attack (Granger 2001a). Dumpster diving may also provide old computer 
equipment for ‘forensic analysis’ such as old hard drives, CDs, memory sticks etc. 
 
Shoulder Surfing – literally looking over one’s shoulder to see what password an employee 




Bogus Surveys – surveys that are left in the mail (usually advertising a cash prize) asking 
subtle questions that cause the individual to unknowingly divulge personal information that 
may later be used by the hacker (FCC 2002) 
 
Pop-up Windows – false windows notifying the individual that their internet connection has 
dropped out and are required to re-enter their user details (username and password). This 
information is then redirected to the hacker (Guenther 2001) 
 
Spyware – used to record credit card information, usernames, passwords and other forms of 
personal information (usually through the use of a keylogger) 
 
Phishing – hackers distribute emails presenting themselves to be from a legitimate 
organisation (e.g Bank). A URL is supplied (directing them to a spoof website) and the target 
is informed that they are required to confirm their personal information (such as username and 
password). This can later be used to illegally access that person’s account (AIC 2005b) 
 
Vishing – the phone version of phishing 
 
Pharming – similar to phishing in the sense that while the user believes they are entering 
their personal details (username, password) into a legitimate site, they are actually using a 
spoofed or mimicked site which emails the user’s details to the hacker for future use. 
Pharming however interferes with the conversion from URL to IP address by poisoning the 
DNS server. Therefore when an individual types in the URL of a site they are redirected to a 
spoof site. (De La Cuarda 2005) 
 
Defence against Social Engineering 
Most people do not realize just how much information they reveal about themselves, or the 
organisations that they work for, in the course of their daily discussions. Security awareness 
programs should include the consequences of ‘loose talk’. Gragg (2002, 10) proposes a multi-
layered defence against social engineering based on a conventional approach to determine 
what the vulnerabilities and threats are and then defend against those risks. He suggests that 
‘the defence must have several layers of protection so that even if a hacker were able to 
penetrate one level, there would be other levels at which he or she would be stopped.’ 
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Regardless whether these are considered as layers or levels, the basic principle of defence in 
depth (or layers) is that the closer you get to the target, the harder it should become. 
 
Security Policy to Address Social Engineering  
The foundation of information security is its policy. The security policy sets the standards and 
levels of security that can be applied to any network, system or environment. As social 
engineering targets people who need to know how to respond to requests. Any established 
policy must support end-users to feel as if they have no choice but to resist the hacker’s 
requests. They should not be in a position where they have to question whether or not certain 
information can be given out. It should be well-defined beforehand by those who construct the 
security policy for the organisation. A security policy should address the conventional 
components in ICT: information access controls; setting-up accounts; access approvals; and, 
password changes. It should also deal with classification of documents and other media, 
locks, ID’s, shredding policy, and the escorting of visitors; and, above all, it must be enforced 
(Granger 2001b, 2) A Security Policy that addresses social engineering helps staff defend 
against those psychological triggers presented above.  Policies also have a ‘balancing effect’ 
on the authority that a person may assume when they call on the phone. A policy defines the 
responsibility for information or access that is given out, so that there is no question as to the 
employee’s own risk when giving away privileged information or access. 
 
Security Awareness Training for all users 
A good social engineer will first try to set up a trusted relationship. All staff must know what 
kind of information a social engineer can use and the kinds of conversations that could be 
suspicious. They should know what confidential information is and recognise their 
responsibility to protect it. They also need to know that when they refuse requests they have 
the backing of management; this is especially important on the occasion where refusals may 
offend. Staff should be aware of the basic indicators present in a social engineering attack. 
Some of these include a refusal by the caller to give contact information, rushing, name-
dropping, intimidation, misspellings, odd questions, and requesting confidential information. 
Employees must be willing to question the inquirer and withhold information when their 
challenges are met with inappropriate responses (Granger 2001b, 3). Security awareness 
training should follow the security policies, but there are some key points that all users should 




1.  Determine Value – Most people undervalue their data and access before being hacked 
or having hardware fail. They need to consider what they would do if they suddenly had no 
access to their computer. 
 
2.  Friends and Enemies – Friends that are made through familiarity over the phone or 
who, for any reason, are asking questions concerning privileged information may be enemies 
and not friends at all. Social engineers make friends with their victims long before they 
request anything. All users should be aware that just because someone seems to be a friend 
does not mean that they can be trusted with privileged data or access. 
 
3.  Passwords – Some hackers will never ask for a password. However, others will come 
up with very convincing reasons using social engineering as to why an employee should give 
their password to a complete stranger. People without security awareness often give their 
password away without much thought, especially when conned into providing information for 
a ‘survey’, entering into a site where they provide their password to be entered into the draw 
for a luxury cruise, or some other seemingly valid reason. Users will often use the same 
password on different systems, so a hacker that may also have obtained the victim’s domain 
access may also gain information through Instant Messenger and chat rooms. 
 
4. Uniforms and Badges – It is easy to make fake badges and get uniforms to pretend 
that an intruder has a legitimate reason to be on site. 
 
5. Key Personnel Resistance - Key personnel include IT help desk personnel, customer 
service, business assistants, secretaries and receptionists and system administrators and 
engineers. Good resistance training will help prevent employees from being persuaded to 
give information away that the hacker might need.  Several resistance-training techniques can 
be used from the field of social psychology to help adequately prepare employees to resist the 
persuasion techniques of a social engineer. 
 
Innoculation – employees are given weakened arguments that will be used by the 
social engineer. It works on the same principle as preventing the spread of a disease by giving 
an innoculation. Employees would be exposed to the arguments that a social engineer might 
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use along with strong refutation argument that could be used by the employee. Studies 
indicate that this is an effective and long-lasting resistance technique. The concern is that the 
trainer must be able to anticipate the all the arguments of the social engineer (Sagarin; 
Cialdini; Rice; Serna; 2002, 527). 
 
Forewarning – relates to the content of an incoming message and the persuasive 
intent of an incoming message. Forewarning of the content causes greater resistance to a 
social engineering attack than the forewarning of persuasive intent. The practical aspect of 
this training is to warn that not only will the social engineer attempt to persuade the target, but 
more importantly, that the arguments they use will be manipulative, deceptive, and insincere. 
Staff must be told that the hacker’s intent is criminal and that they are intent on stealing from 
them. This ‘black and white’ definition of terminology is necessary if forewarning is to be 
effective (Sagarin et al; 2002, 527). 
 
Reality check – It is important to let staff realize that they are vulnerable. Often 
people tend to be unrealistic about their own vulnerability believing that nobody could ever 
fool them. This perception leads many of them to ignore legitimate risks and fail to take 
measures to address those risks. However, once they have this aspect demonstrated to them, 
that they are vulnerable, the training outcome is much more effective (Sagarin et al; 2002, 
536). 
 
There are three stages of perceived susceptibility to risk: 
1. Awareness – knowing a risk exists; 
2. General Vulnerability – a belief in the likelihood of the risk for others; and  
3. Personal Vulnerability – acknowledgement of one’s own personal susceptibility.  
 
Security awareness and resistance training has limited value if it is limited to only awareness 
(Sagarin et al; 2002, 540). 
 
Memory Jogging – one exposure to security awareness training in social engineering 
will only be effective for a short period. Regular memory joggers or reminders are necessary 
to keep people aware of the dangers that may be approaching. This can be done through the 
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use of regular reports of incidents and even no incidents; perhaps as an adjunct to a weekly 
business report, or a regular dedicated security newsletter.  
 
Social Engineering Traps - are set up in the system to actually expose and stop an 
attack. A trap will alert the potential victim and security that an attack is in progress. Gragg 
(2005) presents several suggestions for trapping the social engineer. 
 
The Justified Know-it-all – A bold social engineer will not hesitate to walk 
right into an organisation and start exploring. It is imperative that all personnel be 
briefed on the security risks of the physical presence of a social engineer; and, they 
should have the power to do something quickly to deal with this un-escorted visitor. 
This trap is useful even if badges are used, as hackers will often make a fake badge 
and not expect to be confronted. In large organisations a nominated staff member can 
be assigned to act as a the ‘designated sheep dog’ to ‘round-up’ intruders found 
wandering on their floor. 
 
Centralized Security Logs – must be monitored by information security 
personnel to prevent an effective attack. These are not just the access logs onto a 
network or system; they also include Help Desk and Customer Service requests. In 
fact, there should be a communications channel where a record is kept each time staffs 
are asked to provide sensitive information; or if they are suspicious. For the central log 
to be an effective the log must be examined on a regular basis. 
 
Phone-Back Policy – a simple procedure that seems to be often forgotten, makes an 
effective trap to block the approach from a social engineer in having a password reset. 
Calling back must be supported by a persons ID with secondary and even tertiary 
confirmation information, only known by the company and the true identity.  Again an 
entry in the security log should also be generated. (Farber; 2001, 1) 
 
Three other enhancements can be used to enhance the phone-back policy, or 
used in ‘stand-alone’ mode: 
The Three Questions - provides a list of questions and answers 
that the Help Desk personnel can use to verify identity. These questions 
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would have been arranged earlier with the employee. The questions 
should be obvious for the employee but not for others.  
Bogus Questions - are questions that imply false information 
and give the caller a chance to correct or build upon the false 
information. An example of this type of question would be to ask ‘How 
is your new car?’ If the caller says, ‘I don’t have a new car’ then the 
caller has passed a single test. At this point the employee would 
apologize and explain that they must be mistaken. However, if the 
caller starts talking about the new car, or lets the target talk about the 
new car, then the hacker has been hooked. The person receiving the call 
target should immediately notify security. 
Call Hold – any suspicious call or any call asking for a 
password reset or privileged information should be put on hold. People 
are more easily persuaded to do something questionable when there is 
pressure, surprise, or overloading. The key is to take a minute and 
process the information that is being given, to determine if it is 
legitimate, needs further verification or should be denied. 
 
Incident Response - is critical so that the security network is not just waiting for the social 
engineer to find someone in the organisation that does not know or care about security. A 
well-defined process must exist so that any employee can immediately report an incident as 
soon as they suspect something is wrong. This process should actively follow the hacker and 
proactively inform other potential victims. 
 
Current Trends 
There has been a reported massive increase in the use of bot-nets (zombies) within the last 
year. Symantec reported that on average in excess of 10,000 bots were discovered every day 
in the first six months of 2005. This figure is double the number identified during the same 
period in 2004. The use of phishing as a form of social engineering (1.04 billion detected 
incidences) has also been reported to have nearly doubled from the first half of 2004 to the 
first half of 2005 (Computer Crime Research Centre (CCRC) 2006a, 5). However between the 
periods of 2005-2006 the number of reported phishing incidences has remained relatively the 
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same. This may be due to computer user’s increased awareness of cyber crime and also the 
development of the new technique called pharming (De La Cuarda 2005). 
 
Vishing (the phone version of phishing) may also replace some phishing activity. Vishing is 
used to extract essential credit card information (e.g. account number, expiry date, security 
code) by informing the target that there has been fraudulent activity on their credit account 
and instructing them to call a “help line” where they are further instructed to enter their details 
for confirmation (CCRC 2006b, 1).  
 
These figures seem to support the view that there has been a shift from nuisance hacker 
assaults, to profit-motivated attacks. Attacks are becoming smaller with a more focused 
objective. Keyloggers (programs designed to capture a computer user’s keystrokes) are also 
becoming a more prevalent form of spyware with 93% of companies involved in an IT 
security survey claiming that they had been infected (CCRC 2006c, 4).  
 
Future Trends 
The use of bots is expected to increase in the near future. The community of Bot computers 
are expected to become involved in “more sophisticated, targeted attacks” (CCRC 2006c, 1). 
This reflects a general trend toward more focused attacks in all areas of hacker assaults. While 
syntactic attacks such as worms and viruses were previously spread to cause disruption and 
inconvenience, the use semantic social engineering methods such as bots and pharming are 
used to steal personal information that may be used to access bank accounts. Therefore 
organised crime is expected to utilise this form of criminal activity and take a more active role 
in future high tech crime.  Furthermore, there is expected to be a target shift from desktop 
computers to smart devices i.e. cellular phones, Blackberry’s and other such internet-linked 
organisers, due to user’s inclination to store confidential information such as bank pins on 
such devices. These are expected to become the next prime target for largely semantic attacks.  
 
The introduction of commercial appliances being linked to the internet (e.g. vending 
machines, gas pumps, ATM’s) and the increased usage of mobiles to pay for such products 
suggests that this will be the target area of virus’s in the future. Other non-PC devices will 
also be targeted. This includes routers, switches and backup devices. Furthermore, real-time 
programs such as IM (Instant Messaging) are likely to be increasingly targeted in the near 
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future with a 1,700% year over year increase (CCRC 2006c, 3). There appears to be a trend 
towards a greater emphasis on the development of semantic/human intelligence methods 
rather than the previously used syntactic measures. This is due to semantic methods placing 
value on particular information (i.e credit card information) rather than the use of syntactic 
methods to release viruses and denial-of-service attacks. Human based social engineering is 
able to obtain information in many cases that technological methods are unable to. This 
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